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This book is based on the author's Gifford lectures delivered at Edinburgh in
1988. It deserves notice, first of all, as a bold attempt to 'comprehend in
thought' the present state of the humanities in the West. And it is striking also
as a typical contemporary artefact in its own right—typical at any rate in its
historical eclecticism and in its uneasy self-consciousness with respect to
genre.
The genre to which Alasdair Maclntyre is, ex officio, contributing is that of
the magisterial lecture on natural theology and the foundations of ethics, these
enquiries being understood in terms of the distinctive epistemological assump-
tions embodied in the ninth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (edited in
Edinburgh from 1873 onwards). Thus in order to keep strict faith with the
intentions of his patron Adam Gifford, Maclntyre would have to offer a
discourse on ethics conceived as the Edinburgh 'Encyclopaedists' conceived it,
namely as a positive science based on universally accessible first principles and
progressing towards ever greater systematicity.
To this conception, however—the first of Maclntyre's three 'rivals'—there
stand opposed today two philosophical positions informed by contrasting
reactions to the scientism of the Enlightenment. On the one hand there is
Nietzsche's critique of truth and of the self-identical subject, a development
which calls into question the very possibility of a future for the rationalist
project. On the other hand there is the neo-Thomist insistence that philosophi-
cal enquiry, and a fortiori moral enquiry, should be seen as a 'virtue-guided
craft' (p. 63) into which individuals can be initiated only through apprentice-
ship to already expert thinkers whose authority they recognize. This latter
position is the one with which Maclntyre associates himself; and the task he
undertakes is to show, in defiance of the dominant laisser-faire pluralism, how
genuine debate can take place between philosophical systems whose relation to
each other is one of 'significant incommensurability and untranslatability'.
('Genuine' here means such as to yield evidence of the superiority of one of the
competing systems.) His conclusion—supported by the precedent of Aquinas'
achievement in synthesizing Aristotelianism and Augustinian Christianity—is
that where no common standard of correctness exists in advance of a given
theoretical encounter, the appropriate procedure is to try to show that one's
own system provides means of remedying the self-confessed, or discursively
discoverable, shortcomings of the other: i.e. that one understands the opposi-
tion better than it understands itself. (Chapter IX speculates intriguingly that
Nietzschean genealogy may prove vulnerable to this treatment as a result of its
incomplete emancipation from belief in a temporally unified self.) Maclntyre,
in short, is an advocate of the dialectical method (in so far as this is a matter of
confronting one's adversaries with the internal contradictoriness of their own
cognitive state; cf. Plato, Gorgias 482b). It would have been a service to the
reader to declare this more explicitly and to find a place in the overall scheme of
the book for the philosophy of Hegel, who is mentioned just once (p. 166) as a
'non-Thomistic [or] anti-Thomistic thinker'.
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Maclntyre's hope is for the advent of a 'postliberal university of constrained
disagreements' (p. 234), i.e. one in which fundamental debate about substan-
tive ethical questions would be a mandatory part of scholarly activity (along
with the advancement of enquiry from within one's own ethically committed
frame of reference). This proposal is dubious from the standpoint of academic
power-relations. If the term 'postliberal' is to bear any weight, the constraint in
question here will presumably have to consist in something more than the kind
of diffuse peer pressure to which academics currently respond in selecting
certain publications rather than others for attention and criticism. Are we,
then, to envisage the revival of some high-priestly directional function, 'con-
straining' the wilder (or indeed the more peace-loving) elements to contend
publicly against whatever doctrines are deemed to stand in a suitably ant-
agonistic relation to their own? And if so, how is access to this role to be
regulated, granted the diagnosis of our present cultural predicament as one of
failure to communicate on fundamental questions of value? This phase of
Maclntyre's argument might reasonably, if inadvertently, prompt a renewal of
affection for the slovenly old status quo under which we each find our own
level of moral seriousness and choose our interlocutors at least in part with a
view to our own pleasure. 'Looking away shall be my only negation', wrote
Nietzsche (The Gay Science, §276), and anyone susceptible to boredom will
perhaps feel some sympathy with this as a response to Maclntyre's programme
of 'imposed participation in conflict' (p. 231).
Also disconcerting is the arbitrariness of presenting Thomism as if it
enjoyed a monopoly of the idea of 'tradition-informed thought', when in fact
the historicist insights about knowledge which Maclntyre champions against
liberal rationalism are available today from a wide variety of philosophical
sources. Prominent among these, as no one knows better than Maclntyre
himself, is the literature of Marxism and critical theory—traditions which have
long understood the falsity of picturing ourselves as isolated cognitive units
owing nothing to a shared past, but which have placed this lesson at the service
of a less naive Enlightenment project by showing that reflection on the
contingent, historical basis of our subjectivity can bring us new possibilities of
intelligent choice, and so of freedom. This repression of what might have made
a fourth term in Maclntyre's scheme is particularly noticeable in connection
with his remarks on the fragmented condition of the modern academic world
and on the emergence within it of inherently oppositional tendencies. It is
surely one-sided to discuss these (admittedly important) phenomena solely in
terms of Nietzscheanism and without commenting on that other internal
challenge which expresses the still unspent energy of Enlightenment modern-
ism—the challenge posed by women's studies, black studies and the like.
In its scope and in its rapid transitions, this book retains something of the
brash vitality of the lecturing mode, and it succeeds well in conveying the
interest of some relatively recondite topics such as the academic politics of
thirteenth-century Paris. A more austere writer, though, would have cut the
published text to as little as half of its actual length by cracking down on
repetition, on distracting superfluities of empirical detail, and above all on the
at times hilarious prolixity of its diction.
Sabina Lovibond
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